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Abstract
Appropriate representation is the key to successful reasoning. Hence, if intelligent agents
are to cope with changing goals in a changing environment, they must be able to adapt their
representations, i.e., to detect that a current representation is inadequate, to diagnose its
shortcomings and to repair it. In this paper we address the most basic kind of representational
shortcoming: inconsistency. We focus on how certain kinds of inconsistency can be repaired
using a repair plan that we entitle Where’s My Stuff?. We apply this repair plan manually to
four examples from the domain of Physics. In each case an inconsistent ontology is repaired
into a consistent one. This extends the interest of the Disproving workshop beyond the
“reparation of non-theorems” to the reparation of inconsistent ontologies. The Physics domain
has the advantage that many faulty ontologies have been recorded by historians of science,
together with the evidence that identified their faults and the ontological repairs that were
proposed to mend them. These records provide plenty of data for developing and evaluating
ontology repair plans.
1 Introduction
In [Bundy et al, 2006, McNeill & Bundy, forthcoming] we have described the Ontology Repair
System (ors), which repairs faulty, first-order ontologies by diagnosing the execution failures of
multi-agent plans. These repairs were not just belief revisions, but changes to the underlying
signatures, e.g., adding or removing predicate or function arguments, splitting or conflating predi-
cates or functions. Adding arguments and splitting functions are examples of refinement, in which
ontologies are enriched. An inherent problem with these refinement operations is that they are
only partially defined. For instance, when an additional argument is added to a function it is not
always clear what value each instance should take. When a function is split into two, it is not
always clear to which of the new functions each occurrence of the old one should be mapped.
In current work we are trying to develop a theory of ontology repair and to extend it to new
domains. In this paper we report two advances.
• The aggregation of repair operations into repair plans, which helps address the partial de-
finedness of the refinement operations.
• The development of the Where’s My Stuff1 repair plan and its manual application2 to four
examples from the Physics domain.
Our claim is that the Where’s My Stuff plan can successfully account for the ontological repairs
required in several historic advances in Physics. The evidence for this claim is the manually worked
examples in the rest of this paper.
∗The research reported in this paper was supported by EPSRC grant GR/S01771. Thanks to Graham Steel,
three anonymous Disproving workshop referees and members of the DREAM Group for feedback on an earlier draft.
Thanks to Alan Smaill for assistance with λProlog.
1With apologies to Amazon.
2An implementation in λProlog is under development.
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Our immediate aim is the exploration of mechanisms for ontology repair. Physics is a con-
venient development domain due to the abundance of historical records of fault diagnosis and
repair in Physical ontologies. Our objective is to build a prototype, possibly interactive, computer
program which can emulate3 a wide variety of these historical ontology repair episodes. In future,
this work might lead to some practical application, but this is not our current objective.
By repair plan we mean a compound, possibly hierarchical, system of repair operations, with
associated preconditions and effects, in the way that a proof plan [Bundy, 1991] is a compound
system of rules of inference. The Where’s My Stuff plan is intended to be the first move in
gathering a portfolio of such repair plans, which we hope will collectively cover a large number of
ontology repairs, at least in the Physics domain. For instance, we are currently developing a repair
plan based on adding additional arguments to functions with unexpected variation. The triggering
pattern for this new plan will overlap with that for Where’s My Stuff, providing a rival ontology
repair in some cases. Our hope is that just tens of similar repair plans will provide significant
coverage of historical ontology repairs in Physics; we expect complete coverage to be impossible
due to the need for idiosyncratic or domain-specific repairs in some cases.
Typed higher-order ontologies appear to be required in the Physics domain, since many of
the concepts, for instance, calculus, are essentially higher-order and many of the functions only
make sense when applied to objects of certain types, e.g., Orb V el takes an astronomical object
and returns a real number. So, in this paper, ontology will mean a theory in typed, higher-order
logic. We use the word “ontology” rather than “theory” because: (a) our emphasis on signature
modification might be obscured by the word “theory”; (b) we intend, eventually, to apply the
mechanisms we develop to ontology repair in the semantic web etc. and; (c) this frees up the
word “theory” to refer to the set of theorems of the ontology. Higher-order logic is also required
to describe the modifications to the functions of the ontology, i.e., to describe the mechanisms
themselves.
An ontology O is a pair 〈Sig(O), Ax(O)〉, where Sig(O) is the signature and Ax(O) are the
axioms. The language L(O) of O is set of formulae generated by the grammar Sig(O). The theory
Th(O) of O is the set of theorems generated from the closure of Ax(O) over the rules of inference
of simply-typed lambda calculus, e.g., expressed as a sequent calculus. We will write O ` φ when
φ ∈ Th(O). If ontology O is faulty then the repaired ontology will be denoted ν(O), where ν is
the function that converts the faulty ontologies into repaired ones, i.e., it is the instantiated repair
plan. Since ontology repair could, in principle, involve changes to the underlying logic, we reserve
the right to depart from these definitions (although not in this paper) and have deliberately left
them a little open-ended. Note, in particular, the need for both a typed and higher-order logic, in
contrast to the first-order, sorted logic of ors. As argued above, these extensions are needed for
the Physics domain.
We envisage these repair plans being implemented by higher-order deductive machinery. The
preconditions of each repair plan will contain some patterns expressed as higher-order formulae.
To trigger the repair plan, these patterns will be matched to the original ontology. When they
match, then some higher-order output patterns will be instantiated and thereby form the repaired
ontology. We have started to develop a prototype implementation in the higher-order logic pro-
gramming language λProlog [Miller & Nadathur, 1988]. Since the typed, higher-order Physics
ontologies required for this implementation do not already exist, we are constructing them on an
‘as needed’ basis for each of our test examples. Our examples below are intended to illustrate both
the triggering and the repair mechanisms. The uniform presentation is intended to illustrate the
essentially algorithmic nature of these processes, to convince the reader that they can be readily
implemented. Human intervention is, however, currently required to prepare the ontology to facil-
itate the triggering process. There is a brief discussion of the deductive and search issues involved
in such preparations, but the details are left to further work.
3I.e. “to rival with some degree of success”, but not to provide a historically valid model.
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2 The Where’s My Stuff Ontology Repair Plan
The Where’s My Stuff ontology repair plan is triggered by a mismatch between the predicted and
the actual value of some Physics function on some object. Let us call this function stuff , a higher-
order, variadic, function variable4 from physical objects or systems to some values that can be
added, usually the reals, but we will see, in §5 and §6, that there are other possibilities, so addition
must be polymorphic. The predicted value is a deductive inference from the original ontology of
Physics theory, say Ot ` stuff (~c) = v1, i.e., v1 is the value, predicted by the theoretical ontology
Ot, when stuff is applied to the n arguments in the vector ~c. However, the observed value is v2,
i.e., Os ` stuff (~c) = v2, where Os is the sensory theory whose axioms record the experimental
observations and whose theorems are deductions from these observations. The predicted and
observed values differ, i.e., v1 6= v2, resulting in a contradiction if the ontologies Ot and Os are
combined. So, to summarise, the triggering pattern is:
Ot ` stuff (~c) = v1, Os ` stuff (~c) = v2, Ot ` v1 6= v2 (1)
Note that = is polymorphic; it depends on the type of the value returned by stuff , e.g., reals.
It also needs to be a bit fuzzy, since there is always some noise in experimental data. One way
to achieve this would be to associate error bars with any value and count two values equal if the
intersection of the intervals defined by these error bars was non-empty.
The repair is to split stuff , into three new terms: stuff , stuff σvis and stuff σinvis, where σvis
and σinvis are substitutions that replace one or more higher-order function variables with new
functions of the same type. stuff σvis and stuff σinvis are intended to be the visible and invisible
parts of stuff , respectively. Then stuff is re-defined as the total of these two new functions:
∀~c:~τ . stuff (~c) ::= stuff σvis(~c) + stuff σinvis(~c) (2)
where the τi are the types of the ci and + is polymorphic, depending on the types of the values
returned by stuff , e.g. reals. We have chosen to retain the name of the old stuff function as the
name of the new total function. Alternatively, we could have retained it for the new visible part
of stuff or we need not have retained it at all, choosing, say, a substitution σtotal to create a new
term for the total function. These choices are just a matter of taste.
This new definition (2) is added to the axioms of the repaired theoretical ontology, Ax(ν(Ot)).
The remaining repairs to Ot and Os depend on whether v1 > v2 or v1 < v2, where > and < are
polymorphic total orders. If v1 > v2 then the remaining axioms of the repaired theory are copied
unchanged5 from the original axioms.
Ax(ν(Ot)) ::= {φ | φ ∈ Ax(Ot) ∨ φ = (2)} (3)
where φ = (2) is a convenient abuse of notation intended to abbreviate that φ might be the stuff
definition axiom given in (2) above. (3) defines the axioms of the repaired ontology as being
the old axioms plus (2). In particular, in the repaired ontology, ν(Ot) ` stuff (~c) = v1, i.e., the
problematic prediction is preserved unchanged, but, as we shall see, it ceases to be problematic.
The sensory ontology Os, however, is changed. We now take the observations of stuff to be
observations of stuff σvis.
Ax(ν(Os)) ::= {φ{stuff /stuff σvis} | φ ∈ Ax(Os)}
In particular, Os ` stuff σvis(~c) = v2. So, this observation no longer conflicts with the prediction.
We can no longer directly observe values of stuff , but only of its visible part. At some future point,
we hope we will devise methods to measure stuff σinvis, but not at the current stage of repair.
4We use the anti-Prolog variable/constant convention: lower case letters are variables and upper case are con-
stants.
5Since we have retained the old stuff name for the new total function.
3
If v1 > v2 then the roles of stuff and stuff σvis are reversed: stuff is renamed to stuff σvis in
Ot but retained unchanged in Os, i.e.,
Ax(ν(Ot)) ::= {φ{stuff /stuff σvis} | φ ∈ Ax(Ot) ∨ φ = (2)}
Ax(ν(Os)) ::= {φ | φ ∈ Ax(Os)}
So, the triggering formulae (1) are transformed to one of the following:
ν(Ot) ` stuff (~c) = v1, ν(Os) ` stuff σvis(~c) = v2, if Ot ` v1 > v2 (4)
ν(Ot) ` stuff σvis(~c) = v1, ν(Os) ` stuff (~c) = v2, if Ot ` v1 < v2 (5)
each of which breaks the previous derivation of a contradiction6. Note that this conditional
branching on whether v1 > v2 ensures that stuff σinvis is always positive. Below, we will show
examples of both (4) and (5).
Note how the Where’s My Stuff repair plan overcomes the problem introduced in the last
sentence of the first paragraph of §1: a function is split into three, but we are told exactly
which occurrences of the original function turn into one of the new functions and which to leave
unchanged. The repair also requires the addition of a new axiom and the mapping of some old
derivations into new ones. Despite the compound structure and special properties of this repair
plan, it is surprisingly widely applicable to the emulation of historical ontology repairs in Physics.
In the next four sections we apply it, manually, to four such repairs, drawn from different areas of
Physics and from different historical periods.
3 Application to the Latent-Heat Paradox
We start by applying it to the discovery of latent-heat by Joseph Black around 1750. [Wiser & Carey, 1983]
discusses a period when heat and temperature were conflated, which presented a conceptual barrier
that Black had to overcome before he could formulate the concept of latent heat. This conflation
creates a paradox: as water is frozen it is predicted to lose heat, but its heat, as measured by tem-
perature, remains constant. Black had to split the concept of heat into energy and temperature.
We can model this situation with the following formulae:
Ot ` Heat(H2O,Start(Freeze)) = Heat(H2O,Start(Freeze)) (6)
Os ` Heat(H2O,Start(Freeze)) = Heat(H2O,End(Freeze)) (7)
Ot ` Heat(H2O,Start(Freeze)) 6= Heat(H2O,End(Freeze)) (8)
where H2O is the water being frozen, Freeze is the time interval during which the freezing takes
place, Start returns the first moment of this period and End the last. (6) comes from the reflexive
law of equality, (7) comes from the observed constant temperature during freezing and (8) is
deduced from the then current physical theory that heat decreases strictly monotonically when
objects are cooled.
These formulae match the repair plan trigger (1) with the following substitution:
{Heat/stuff , 〈H2O,Heat(H2O,Start(Freeze))〉/~c, Heat(H2O,Start(Freeze))/v1, Heat(H2O,End(Freeze))/v2}
To effect the repair we will define σvis = {Temp/stuff } and σinvis = {LHF/stuff }, respectively,
in anticipation of their intended meanings, where LHF can be read as the latent heat of fusion.
These choices instantiate (2) to:
∀o:obj, t:mom. Heat(o, t) ::= Temp(o, t) + LHF (o, t)
which is not quite what is required, but is along the right lines. Some further indirect observations
of LHF are required to witness its behaviour under different states of o so that it can be further
6Which is not to say that some other contradiction does not still lurk undetected.
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repaired, e.g., the removal of its t argument. The Temp part of the new definition needs to be
further refined so that its contribution of energy depends both on temperature and mass. These
further refinements will be the subject of future ontology repair plans.
In the repaired ontologies, since Heat(H2O,Start(Freeze)) > Heat(H2O,End(Freeze)), the
repaired triggering formulae are transformed to :
ν(Ot) ` Heat(H2O,Start(Freeze)) = Heat(H2O,Start(Freeze))
ν(Os) ` Temp(H2O,Start(Freeze)) = Temp(H2O,End(Freeze))
which breaks the derivation of the detected contradiction, as required.
4 Application to the Bouncing-Ball Paradox
Our second example is based on an experiment described in [diSessa, 1983]. In [Bundy et al, 2006]
we described it thus:
“. . . consider the experiment conducted by Andreas diSessa on first-year MIT physics
students [diSessa, 1983]. The students were asked to imagine a situation in which a
ball is dropped from a height onto the floor. Initially, the ball has potential but not
kinetic energy. Just before it hits the floor it has kinetic but not potential energy. As
it hits the floor it has neither. Where did the energy go?”
The paradox arises because students typically idealise the ball as a particle without extent. How-
ever, the energy is stored in the compression of the ball7 and this cannot be represented unless
the idealisation of the ball has extent.
We can model this situation with the following formulae:
Ot ` TE(Ball, End(Drop)) = TE(Ball, Start(Drop)) (9)
Os ` TE(Ball, End(Drop)) = 0 (10)
Ot ` TE(Ball, Start(Drop)) 6= 0 (11)
where Ball is the ball, Drop is the time interval from its release to contact with the ground and
TE(Ball, t) is the total energy of the ball at time moment t. (9) comes from the law of conservation
of energy; (10) comes from the observation that the ball is stationary and at zero height at the
point of contact with the ground, so has neither potential nor kinetic energy; and (11) comes from
the inference that the original energy of the ball consists of potential energy which is not zero.
The substitution required to instantiate the trigger (1) with these three formulae is:
{TE/stuff , 〈Ball, End(Drop)〉/~c, TE(Ball, Start(Drop))/v1, 0/v2}
To effect the repair we will define σvis = {TEpart/stuff } and σinvis = {EE/stuff }, so the new
definition of TE that is proposed is:
∀o:obj, t:mom. TE(o, t) ::= TEpart(o, t) + EE(o, t)
where TEpart(o, t) is the total energy of a particle, defined as sum of its potential and kinetic
energy, and EE(o, t) is some invisible energy to be discovered. This invisible energy will turn out
to be the elastic potential energy of the ball viewed as a spring: EE(Ball, End(Drop)). But the
need to identify a source for this invisible energy could be the incentive to re-idealise the ball as
an object with a type that has such an additional source of energy available, e.g., a spring.
In the repaired ontologies, since TE(Ball, Start(Drop)) > 0, the repaired triggering formulae
are:
ν(Ot) ` TE(Ball, End(Drop)) = TE(Ball, Start(Drop))
ν(Os) ` TEpart(Ball, End(Drop)) = 0
which breaks the previous derivation of a contradiction, as required.
7And also of the floor, but we will ignore this factor in this exercise.
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5 Application to Dark Matter
Our third example is the invention8 of dark matter. The evidence for dark matter arises comes
from various sources, for instance, from an anomaly in the orbital velocities of stars in spiral
galaxies9 identified by Rubin in 1975. Given the observed distribution of mass in these galaxies,
we can use Newtonian Mechanics to predict that the orbital velocity of each star should be inversely
proportional to the square root of its distance from the galactic centre (called its radius). However,
observation of these stars show their orbital velocities to be roughly constant and independent of
their radius. Figure 1 illustrates the predicted and actual graphs. In order to account for this
discrepancy, it is hypothesised that galaxies also contain a halo of, so called, dark matter, which
is invisible to our radiation detectors, such as telescopes, because it does not radiate, so can only
be measured indirectly.
This diagram is taken from http: // en. wikipedia. org/ wiki/ Galaxy_ rotation_
problem . The x-axis is the radii of the stars and the y-axis is their orbital velocities.
The dotted line represents the predicted graph and the solid line is the observed graph.
Figure 1: Predicted vs Observed Stellar Orbital Velocities
We can trigger the preconditions (1) of the Where’s My Stuff plan with the following formulae:
Ot ` λs ∈ Spiral. 〈Rad(s), Orb V el(s)〉 = GraphA (12)
Os ` λs ∈ Spiral. 〈Rad(s), Orb V el(s)〉 = GraphB (13)
Ot ` GraphA 6= GraphB (14)
where Orb V el(s) is the orbital velocity of star s, Rad(s) is the radius of s from the centre of
its galaxy and Spiral is a particular spiral galaxy, represented as the set of stars it contains.
Formula (12) is the predicted orbital velocity graph based on the observed distribution of the
visible stars and their masses in a spiral galaxy: the orbital velocity decreases inversely with the
square root of the radius. Formula (13) is the observed orbital velocity graph: it is almost a
constant function over most of the values of s. Note the use of λ abstraction to create graph
objects as unary functions. These two graphs are unequal (14), within the range of legitimate
experimental variation.
GraphA is deduced by Newtonian Mechanics from the observed distribution of mass in the
spiral, i.e., it is a function, say, M2OV (mass to orbital velocity) 10 of the mass distribution
8discovery?
9http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dark_matter
10Alternatively, the actual formula might be inserted here, but it is enough for our purposes to know that such a
formula exists, and the actual formula would clutter and obscure the picture. It involves complex calculus requiring
computer calculation to give a solution.
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graph: λs ∈ Spiral. 〈Rad(s),Mass(s)〉:
O ` λs ∈ Spiral. 〈Rad(s), Orb V el(s)〉 = M2OV (λs ∈ Spiral. 〈Rad(s),Mass(s)〉) (15)
= GraphA
Of course, the actualM2OV calculation was done in the reverse direction: the mass distribution of
the dark matter was calculated so that the predicted orbital velocities would fit the observational
evidence.
These three formulae instantiate the trigger preconditions (1) with the following substitution:
{λs ∈ g. 〈Rad(s), Orb V el(s)〉/stuff , 〈Spiral〉/~c, GraphA/v1, GraphB/v2}
Note that the repair plan works perfectly well with higher-order objects as the values v1 and v2,
provided polymorphic + and 6= can be defined as having meaning over this data-type: in this case
a piecewise addition over the individual values for each star and a fuzzy, negated equality between
graphs.
To effect the repair we will define σvis = {Spiralvis/g} and σinvis = {Spiralinvis/g}, so the
instantiation of definition (2) suggested by this triggering is:
λs ∈ Spiral. 〈Rad(s), Orb V el(s)〉
::= λs ∈ Spiralvis. 〈Rad(s), Orb V el(s)〉+ λs ∈ Spiralinvis. 〈Rad(s), Orb V el(s)〉
where Spiralvis is the visible part of the galaxy, that can be detected from its radiation, and
Spiralinvis is its dark matter part. Note that Spiral = Spiralvis ∪ Spiralinvis, which is also an
instantiation of definition (2), if you treat ∪ as addition for sets, but we cannot see how to trigger
this simpler redefinition using the trigger (1).
In the repaired ontologies, since GraphA < GraphB , the repaired triggering formulae are:
ν(Ot) ` λs ∈ Spiralvis. 〈Rad(s), Orb V el(s)〉 = GraphA
ν(Os) ` λs ∈ Spiral. 〈Rad(s), Orb V el(s)〉 = GraphB
which breaks the previous derivation of a contradiction, as required.
6 Application to the Precession of the Perihelion of Mer-
cury
Our fourth, and last, example was suggested to us by the sociologist of science, Harry Collins: the
precession of the perihelion of Mercury, i.e., the gradual rotation of the elliptical form of the orbit
(see Figure 2). The orbits of the planets in the Solar System precess in this way. This is predicted
by Newtonian Mechanics. However, Mercury’s orbit does not precess by quite the right amount
(http://physics.ucr.edu/~wudka/Physics7/Notes_www/node98.html). Nowadays, we under-
stand this as an accurate prediction of Einstein’s General Theory of Relativity, but for a long while
it was believed to be caused by the gravitational attraction of an additional planet, named Vulcan,
that was even closer to the Sun. Observation eventually ruled this out, but it is this (erroneous)
prediction that we wish to model. Alternatively, we could have shown how a similar ontological
repair could emulate the successful discovery of Pluto, but it is important to emphasise that our
repair plan can be used to emulate ultimately unsuccessful ontology repairs, as well as successful
ones.
We can represent the orbit of Mercury with the function λt. Posn(Mercury, t), where Posn(o, t)
is the 3D coordinate of object o at time t according to some implicit frame of reference. The trig-
gering formulae are then:
Ot ` λt. Posn(Mercury, t) = Orbitp (16)
Os ` λt. Posn(Mercury, t) = Orbito (17)
Ot ` Orbitp 6= Orbito (18)
7
This diagram is taken from http: // physics. ucr. edu/ ~wudka/ Physics7/ Notes_
www/ node98. html#fig: prec. mercury . It shows the elliptical orbits of Mercury
themselves rotating.
Figure 2: Precession of the Perihelion of Mercury
where (16) is the predicted orbit of Mercury, (17) is the observed orbit and (18) asserts that these
are not equal. Unfortunately, these triggers will not give us the right repair. What we would like
is that Solar System appeared in the term that instantiated stuff in (1). Then we could use (2)
to define:
Solar System ::= Solar Systemvis ∪ Solar Systeminvis
where Solar Systeminvis = {V ulcan}. Unfortunately, we can’t see a way of legitimately intro-
ducing Solar System into the LHS of (16), say. However, all is not lost. The predicted orbit of
Mercury, Orbitp, is calculated by considering the mass distribution of the Solar System.
λt. Posn(Mercury, t) = M2O(λs ∈ Solar System, t. 〈Posn(s, t),Mass(s)〉)
= Orbitp
where M2O is the calculation of the orbit of Mercury from the distribution of mass in the Solar
System over time, i.e., taking into account the gravitational influences of the sun and the other
planets. As with M2OV in formula (15) in §5, M2O will be some complex function involving
calculus and requiring computer calculation, but for our purposes the details do not matter; it is
enough that some such function exists.
By putting this calculation into reverse11 (M2O−1), we can create an alternative set of trigger
formulae that do contain Solar System, as required, namely:
Ot ` λo ∈ Solar System, t. 〈Posn(o, t),Mass(o)〉 =M2O−1(Orbitp)
Os ` λo ∈ Solar System, t. 〈Posn(o, t),Mass(o)〉 =M2O−1(Orbito) (19)
Ot ` M2O−1(Orbitp) 6=M2O−1(Orbito)
This set of triggers also has the nice property of predicting the mass distribution of the Solar
System from the observed orbit of Mercury (this is what (19) means), and hence predicting the
position of Vulcan. These three formulae instantiate the trigger preconditions (1) with the follow-
ing substitution:
{λo ∈ s, t. 〈Posn(o, t),Mass(o)〉/stuff , 〈Solar System〉/~c, M2O−1(Orbitp)/v1, M2O−1(Orbito)/v2}
11Assuming this is a function.
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To effect the repair we will define σvis = {Solar Systemvis/s} and σinvis = {Solar Systeminvis/s},
so the instantiation of definition (2) suggested by this triggering is:
ν(Ot) ` λo ∈ Solar System, t. 〈Posn(o, t),Mass(o)〉
= λo ∈ Solar Systemvis, t. 〈Posn(o, t),Mass(o)〉+ λo ∈ Solar Systeminvis, t. 〈Posn(o, t),Mass(o)〉
as required. In the repaired ontologies, since M2O−1(Orbitp) < M2O−1(Orbito), the repaired
triggering formulae are:
ν(Ot) ` λo ∈ Solar Systemvis, t. 〈Posn(o, t),Mass(o)〉 =M2O−1(Orbitp)
ν(Os) ` λo ∈ Solar System, t. 〈Posn(o, t),Mass(o)〉 =M2O−1(Orbito)
which breaks the previous derivation of a contradiction, as required.
This example demonstrates another dimension of choice: we may have to search back through
the derivation of the contradicted prediction in order to find the most appropriate form for the
trigger. We think this kind of choice was really also present in the previous examples, but we got
lucky and managed to avoid making it explicit. For instance, in the Bouncing Ball example in §4,
the trigger was phrased in terms of total energy, although this can hardly be directly observed.
What can be observed is positions, distances and mass, from which the energies can be inferred
and the contradiction derived. If this had been made more explicit then we think this dimension
of search would have been revealed here too. Similar remarks can also be made about the dark
matter example. Notice how this again forces us to mix theory and observation to deduce the
theory-contradicting observation.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have described the Where’s My Stuff ontology repair plan. It consists of a
higher-order, triggering pattern describing a particular kind of disagreement between theoretical
predictions and experimental observations: a function stuff is predicted to have one value, but
is observed to have another. When this pattern can be instantiated to a situation occurring
in particular theoretical and sensory ontologies then this triggers some ontological repairs. The
repairs have two main parts. Firstly, function refinement is applied to divide stuff into three
functions: one for visible stuff, one for invisible stuff and one for their total. The original stuff is
replaced by the total stuff in one ontology, but by the visible stuff in the other. Secondly, a new
definition is added to the repaired theoretical ontology which defines the total function as the sum
of the other two. These repairs disrupt the derivation of the contradiction.
We have applied this repair plan to four examples: latent heat, deSessa’s bouncing ball , the
invention of dark matter and the precession of the perihelion of Mercury. In each case we see that
the repair plan provides a significant part of the required repair, but leaves some areas to be fixed.
We also see that there are choices that require heuristic guidance. These choices arise in at least
two ways: choices over which functions to refine into visible, invisible and their total, and choices
over how far back to go in the derivations of the prediction and observation to identify the trigger
formulae.
The dark matter and Mercury examples are particularly interesting, as stuff has to be instan-
tiated to a compound λ term. It also shows the need for polymorphic +, = and >, since these
need to be interpreted differently depending on the data-type.
It’s instructive to compare this repair plan with standard belief revision12. In belief revision
the problem is to add some new belief φ to an existing ontology O. The interesting case is
when just adding φ as a new axiom creates inconsistency. In this case, φ is usually assumed to
take precedence over O, and O is adjusted by reducing its theory, up to and including removing
O altogether. All this is done within a fixed signature. The Where’s My Stuff repair plan, is
triggered because an inconsistency will be created if we add, say, an observation φ to ontology Ot.
12http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belief_revision
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But φ does not take precedence. In fact, the signature is changed 13 so that both φ and Ot can
be retained, but with a modified understanding of what each means. One is now seen to apply
to a larger totality of stuff than previously assumed and the other just to the original, narrower
conception of visible stuff. In this way, the inconsistency is made to melt away, but we come
away with a richer conception of the world’s complexity, including new questions about how to
investigate the newly hypothesised invisible stuff.
Implementing a repair mechanism based on this repair plan requires higher-order matching
and deduction, as well as some search control. The higher-order logic-programming language
λProlog is well suited as an implementation, since it embodies all three elements. A λProlog
implementation is currently under development.
We’ve been surprised to discover just how general the Where’s My Stuff plan is. When we
started this work we thought we knew a couple of examples, and had rejected two others: the
bouncing ball and the precession of Mercury’s orbit. But these rejected ones turned out to be
examples too. Generality is just what we want, but, of course, it won’t be enough. For instance,
if it is applied too often we will get ‘epicycles’. When we have 10 kinds of matter ranging from
very light to very dark, then we will know it is time to apply the Occam’s Razor repair plan ^.
We wonder what other plans are out there waiting to be revealed.
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